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SIMLAW 2011t
Randal C. Picker*
Professor Picker contemplates his own agent-based computer
simulation game-SimLaw 2011. He uses this vehicle to describe
how "organized decision making" may differ substantially from indi-
vidualized decision making. The simulations are available on the
Internet, and the article is best read with access to a computer. Then
he analyzes the consequences that organized decision making may
have on future decisions made by our biggest organization-the gov-
ernment.
Simulation games have been popular since the very beginning of
computer use. I will date myself by saying that I played Adventure-a
text-based fantasy search game-in college on a university mainframe.
Nowadays, simulations are perhaps the most successful game form on
PCs, ranging from Flight Simulator, to Adventure successors such as
Tomb Raider, starring the tough but fetching Lara Croft, to fantasy
sports games, such as NBA Live 2002, for pro sports wannabes. The cur-
rent leader of the pack is the Electronic Arts collection of "Sim" games,
including SimCity 3000, an update of the modem classic SimCity (now
with "more disasters"); SimCoaster and SimThemePark, for potential
theme park tycoons; and, most dramatically, "The Sims," a simulation
family, where you get to "create and control people" (and build hot tubs
at the same time). Not only are The Sims the current top-selling game,
its "Livin' Large" and "House Party" expansion packs take spots two
and three.'
But Electronic Arts does not sell SimLaw, and it is the possibility of
simulating social settings and the role of law in those settings that is the
focus of this essay. As described below, I want to focus on a particular
kind of simulation, agent-based computer simulations. Over the next
t Copyright © 2002, Randal C. Picker. All Rights Reserved.
* Paul and Theo Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law, The University of Chicago Law
School. Senior Fellow, The Computation Institute of the University of Chicago and Argonne National
Laboratory.
I thank the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the Lynde & Harry Bradley Foundation for their gener-
ous research support.
1. See Mike Snider, Gamers Are Creating a "God Games" Frenzy, USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 2001,
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decade, I believe that we will see agent simulations become an important
part of social science. Agent simulations nicely link together two impor-
tant developments, the rise of game theory as a standard tool in social
science-including economics, political science, and international rela-
tions-plus the growing raw power of personal computers, whether
standing alone or networked together.
The rise of game theory in economics is reasonably well evidenced
by the growing number of textbooks that either focus on game theory or
that rely on it when addressing a particular topic, such as industrial or-
ganization.2 The growing power of computers is the stuff of Moore's law
and of everyday experience. What is less obvious is what this means for
computer analysis relative to other forms of analysis. The relative cost of
using computer simulations is decreasing, so we should expect to see
more of them. It is only getting marginally easier, however, to do the
sort of solve-the-equation solutions-usually called "closed-form" solu-
tions-favored by most economists. Experiments involving live subjects
have always been difficult, and now are frequently subject to state or
federal regulations.' To some extent, the costs associated with compiling
and manipulating data are clearly dropping-tracking the drop in the
price of computing power-but important areas of data are still quite in-
accessible and expensive to obtain. Everything pushes in favor of com-
puter simulations.
If agent simulation becomes important in social science -and there
is growing evidence that we are on that path4-entrepreneurial legal
scholars will seek to import these methods into the law schools. Almost
by definition, young scholars, to be successful, have to do something dif-
ferent from those before them-there is no academic profit in writing the
same articles that your predecessors did. New methodologies are the
best source of great change, and new scholars, especially if they are com-
puter savvy, are often better situated to experiment. So, as agent-based
social science becomes a reality, it will become a reality for legal scholar-
ship as well, though not without much difficulty.
In the balance of this essay, I will consider three topics. First, I will
briefly address a piece of the behavioral law and economics critique of
2. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1995); DREW
FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY (1991); ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR
APPLIED ECONOMISTS (1992); ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY (1991); JEAN TIROLE, THE
THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988).
3. See, e.g., STANFORD UNIVERSITY, THE HUMAN SUBJECTS MANUAL, available at http://
humansubjects.stanford.edu/manualindex.html (the manual applicable to research at Stanford Uni-
versity).
4. For early applications of this method, see ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF
COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION (1997); JOSHUA M.
EPSTEIN & ROBERT AXTELL, GROWING ARTIFICIAL SOCIETIES 165-71 (1996); and MITCHELL
RESNICK, TURTLES, TERMITES, AND TRAFFIC JAMS 81-88 (1994). For more recent work, see, for ex-
ample, the March 2001 issue of the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, which is devoted to
agent-based computational economics. See also Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World:
A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997).
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rationality. Second, I will sketch out how agent-based simulations cap-
ture decision making and offer four examples. A word of warning: You
probably will not be able to read and understand the four examples
without Internet access because the simulations and the charts associated
with them are posted online.' Finally, I will try to tie the lessons of the
simulations to issues associated with mandatory disclosure of informa-
tion.
I. BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZED DECISION
MAKING
The rational actor model that has dominated law and economics is
now under attack. Instead of coldly calculating Homo Economicus, we
are presented with a more realistic, more complex model of how deci-
sions are actually made. To pick a prominent example, Jolls, Sunstein,
and Thaler6 focus on three aspects of boundedness: bounded rationality,
bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest.7 These phrases are not
completely self-explanatory, but you undoubtedly get the gist without
much more explanation. Bounded rationality and bounded willpower
reduce the quality of the decisions that are made. A smarter person
might have chosen not to smoke, while the boundedly rational person
chooses to smoke. Bounded willpower means that I will not resist the
piece of chocolate cake, even though in a different context I might ex-
press a preference not to eat the cake. In both cases, a decision is made
that might be improved upon by a person who was less bounded.
Bounded self-interest is quite different: it says nothing necessarily about
the quality of the decisions that are made, but rather addresses what an
actor really cares about when making decisions.'
The importance of this framework for law is yet to be determined,9
but the hunch here is that this is an attempt to lay the groundwork for a
more activist government. The superiority of private ordering in context
5. Randal C. Picker, SimLaw 2011, at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Picker/IllinoisPaper/ (last
visited Nov. 5, 2001). The movies are set up as avi files. Your browser probably is already set up to
play these and may invoke the Windows Media player. That will work, but the standard Windows
Media Player does not support frame-by-frame play of movies. The best approach for fine-grained
views of the movies is to download them from the website and open them using the Media Player that
comes with Windows (but this is not the Windows Media Player-is that sufficiently confusing?). You
can find the Media Player by running a search on your computer under the name "mplayer.exe" or
"mplay32.exe." On my computer, it is located in the C:\\WINNT\System32 folder. I actually use the
Windows version of Apple's QuickTime to play the movies, so that should work as well, on Windows
or on a Macintosh.
6. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471
(1998).
7. Id. at 1476-79.
8. See ELLIOTT SOBER & DAVID SLOAN WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE EVOLUTION AND
PSYCHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR (1998).
9. For an extensive collection of articles, see BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sun-
stein ed., 2000).
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after context-whether assumed or proven-is used as a powerful stick
to beat off government encroachment. Undermine the basis of those de-
cisions and all of a sudden government intervention into otherwise pri-
vate domains seems more plausible. That assumes, of course, that gov-
ernment decision making is less subject to boundedness concerns, but
hold that issue for now. Boundedness does not uniformly suggest more
law because bounded self-interest actually may reduce the need for law
so as to reduce, for example, negative externalities. If I care about not
imposing costs on others-an example of bounded self-interest-I may
limit my own smoking so as not to subject others to the risk of sec-
ondhand smoke. The perceived need for a government response to ex-
ternalities is driven by the assumption that the actor creating the exter-
nality will not care about it and will not internalize the cost imposed on
third parties. If I did that instinctively, we might narrow the domain of
law considerably.
In this essay, I consider only bounded rationality and make one key
point: organized decision making may differ markedly from decision
making by isolated individuals. "Organized decision making" includes
decisions made by organizations, including the government, and also en-
compasses decisions made by individuals in consultation with others or
with reference to the decisions of others. To understand the importance
of boundedness, it is critical to separate decision making by isolated indi-
viduals-think of folks stuffed into one of those game show isolation
booths forced to make decisions-from organized decision making.
For the isolated individual, the quality of her decisions will reflect,
and will only reflect, her intrinsic ability to map data to desired out-
comes. She may make repeated poor decisions and yet have no real
chance for improving her decision making. We should pause to consider
what a "poor" decision is. One idea is that a poor decision is one she re-
grets afterwards. The eaten chocolate cake falls into this category. A
second idea is that the preferences of the individual could be better satis-
fied given a different, available choice. This is to choose inside the
Pareto frontier, rather than at the boundary. A poor decision of the first
sort will be recognized by the person making the decision, and she may
be able to take steps to improve future decision making (such as avoiding
contexts in which chocolate cake will be available). Poor decisions of the
second sort-missed opportunities-by their very nature will typically go
unnoticed and the individual will learn very little about how to improve
her decision making.
Organized decision making holds out the possibility of substantial
improvement. If, for example, the individual could compare her decision
with that of an identically situated person, the opportunity that she origi-
nally missed might jump out at her. This is a relatively simple compari-
son: it involves evaluating the two choices made, determining which is
better, and confirming that both of them were available to the original
[Vol. 20021022
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decision maker. The first person need not map out the entire opportu-
nity set-that really does involve hard analysis that we should not de-
mand of a bounded decision maker-but just makes simple two-point
comparisons. Actually, neither person need map out all of the opportu-
nities, but both can assess a single opportunity, choose that, and then
compare notes afterwards. This does, of course, require some ability to
convey to another your own experiences, and this is not a trivial task, but
even that can be avoided if we just imagine that the conversation makes
salient the choices made by others.
The possibility of organizing decision making should have dramatic
consequences for the quality of the decisions that will be made. As is
probably clear, a group communicating in the fashion just described will
quickly search the relevant possibility space and locate an option close to
the optimal solution. The ability to identify original solutions tracks
most directly the isolated individual model of JST, though even there the
correspondence may be relatively weak. Organizations put together
teams to solve problems, and how those teams are organized will effect
the extent to which the isolated individual bounded rationality problem
percolates.
Put in the language of management consulting, an organization
should be as good as its best decision maker, an idea captured in the no-
tion of "best practices." Organizations need to identify solutions, iden-
tify that they have identified a solution, and communicate that solution
throughout the organization. And this is tricky. This could be seen as
just a problem of communication: the Austin, Texas branch of the firm
has discovered the solution, and needs to communicate that solution to
branches in Chicago and Palo Alto. The problem, however, is more
complex. A decision is made and an outcome is observed: how do we
know whether we can do better? As is well known, just searching around
in the area near our candidate solution may fail to identify a better solu-
tion. You may have to go down, before you can go up.
II. AGENT-BASED COMPUTER SIMULATIONS AND ORGANIZED
DECISION MAKING
I think that these ideas are relatively straightforward in the abstract,
but I will attempt to make them much more concrete using an agent-
based computer simulation. This technique is particularly effective for
exploring heterogeneity, and this is what drives organizing better deci-
sions, both for organizations and individuals. We can make clear the cir-
cumstances under which very simple decision rules lead to rapid conver-
gence on optimal solutions. Each of the agents will be boundedly
rational. They will do no more than make a selection at random, make
selections from those observed, observe outcomes, and compare them.
These are simple tasks, but when aggregated, they prove quite powerful.
No. 4]
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Almost any stylized setting is arbitrary, but I will focus on a stan-
dard setting from game theory, the coordination game. The most basic
coordination game has the following form:
FIGURE 1
Player 2
Left Right
Left 1,1 0,0
Player 1
Right 0,0 b, b
Payoffs: (Player 1, Player 2)
We have two players, each of whom faces two options. If both
players play "left," each player will receive a payoff of 1. If both choose
"right," each will receive a payoff of b. If they do not make the same
choice-one plays "left" while the other plays "right"-they get nothing.
This is known as a coordination game, for reasons that are probably ob-
vious. The players want to coordinate their choices, and depending on
the value of b, will want to coordinate on left or right.
The strategies left and right are obviously quite abstract, but we
could translate this game quickly into any number of relevant situations.
Consider a couple contemplating marriage and the possibility of a pre-
nuptial agreement. In the prenuptial agreement game, the strategies are
"don't ask" and "ask." Neither player wants to be the only one asking
for a prenuptial agreement-it might be seen as a lack of commitment to
the marriage-so the prospective partners want to coordinate success-
fully.
I want to generalize this coordination game to allow the possibility
of many choices, rather than just two, and to introduce the reality that
the best course of action may not be obvious to the players, but must in-
stead be learned during the course of play. So, as in the basic coordina-
tion game set forth above, value is created by successfully coordinating
with the other players, but value is also created by finding the right hid-
den target value.
The following payoff function is one way of achieving these goals:
In this function, s is the strategy for agent i or agent j, v is the target
fAsi'sj)=Zmnin's s i 'si min { - - - / m i n S-vVs
value, and Z just scales the payoffs. Successful coordination between
agents raises the value of the term in the first bracket (which has a
maximum value of 1 when the agents make the same choice). Matching
[Vol. 2002
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the target increases the value of the second and third min functions
(which also max out at 1).
Players will play this game round by round. Think of each player as
being in the center square of a tic-tac-toe board. In a given round, each
player interacts with her immediate eight neighbors, though as players
move around, she will not necessarily have eight neighbors, as some cells
may be empty. She plays the coordination game we saw before with
each, but she only plays one strategy per round. What she gets-her
payoff-is determined by her choice and that of her neighbors, as set
forth by the above function. Play takes place on a much larger grid, but
each agent focuses on her tic-tac-toe board-in simulation language, the
Moore neighborhood on which the agent is centered.
In the first round, I assign strategies at random from a range of a
minimum value of 0 to a maximum value of 200. The values given to
agents are uniformly distributed throughout this range. This means that
any number of strategies are at work at any time. Players select a new
strategy in each round by looking at their neighbors in her Moore
neighborhood. The agent chooses the strategy that resulted in the high-
est payoff observed in the immediately preceding round. So the agent
looks around at her neighbors, observes what worked best, and adopts
that strategy. This process repeats in each round.
The larger board on which play takes place is a mechanical detail,
but important conceptually. As to details, it is a 101 x 101 grid, and thus
has 10,201 spots with no real edges-it is a torus. Conceptually, the
board can be thought of as representing a society. It can also be thought
of as a firm, with the individual agents working within the same firm.
Two other variables are of interest. To make clear the role that
movement plays in transmitting information, an explicit movement rate
is established. The movement rate determines the percentage of agents
allowed to move each round. Otherwise, the agent remains fixed in
place. The second variable of interest is a rate of spontaneous mutation.
In each round, a designated percentage of agents simply redraws from
the original distribution of strategies.
A. Simulation No. 1
To get our feet wet, consider an example: set the target value equal
to 85, the spontaneous mutation rate equal to 0, and the movement rate
equal to 100% (meaning that each agent moves in each round). The
choice of 85 is purely arbitrary. Populate the grid with 5100 agents, so we
have an equal number of agents and open spots in the grid. To see this
simulation, play Simulation No. l.1 The movies use a ten-color scheme
to convey information about the various strategies. Agents in the lowest
10. Randal C. Picker, SimLaw 2011, at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Picker/IllinoisPaper/
MM1AMOOV.AVI (last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
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decile will be coded as black; those in the next brown; followed by: vio-
let, blue, red, green, sky, cyan, pink, and finally, magenta. We will also
track the lowest and highest strategies played and the average strategy
played in each round.
In the simulation, colors are assigned by strategy in the following
way:
TABLE 1
Color Strategy Range
Black (0.1999, 20.2788)
Brown (20.2788, 40.3577)
Violet (40.3577, 60.4366)
Blue (60.4366, 80.5156)
Red (80.5156, 100.5945)
Green (100.5945, 120.6734)
Sky (120.6734, 140.7523)
Cyan (140.7523, 160.8312)
Pink (160.8312, 180.9102)
Magenta (180.9102, 200.9891)
The target value of 85 lies squarely within the red range.
The initial board in the movie reflects that strategies are assigned at
random over the full range of [0-200]. And if you look at Chart IA,1
you will see that each strategy decile starts out at the same 10% level. As
rounds are played and agents make decisions based on observation and
updating, the society evolves rapidly. Three rounds in, three strategy
deciles predominate-red, the decile containing the target; blue, the dec-
ile just below the target; and green, the decile just above the target.
Chart 1A confirms that, as does visual inspection of the movie. And by
three rounds in, four deciles-the top two and the bottom two-have al-
most vanished.
By nine rounds in, more than 98% of the players are in the target
red decile, which can again be confirmed by continuing to play the movie
frame by frame and by examining Chart 1A. By the fifteenth round, all
players are in the target red decile. The movie stays all red for all rounds
after that, but that just reflects the crudeness of the color-coding scheme.
Remember that the red decile ranges from 80.5 to 100.6, so many agents
could be missing the target of 85. As Chart 1Ba2 makes clear, at the fif-
teenth round, there is a sizable gap between the low red strategy, 82.4,
and the high red strategy, 93.2. But at round 30, fifteen rounds later, the
low is 84.8 and the high 85.2.
11. Randal C. Picker, SimLaw 2011, at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Picker/IllinoisPaper/
ChartlA.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
12. Randal C. Picker, SimLaw 2011, at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Picker/IllinoisPaper/
ChartlB.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
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This is a good result. We get rapid convergence to the target. The
population-the organization-rapidly searches for, learns, and commu-
nicates the superior strategy. Under these circumstances, very simple
decision rules for individuals lead to quite sophisticated decision making
for the organization. Put differently, the individuals may not be very
smart, but the organization is.
B. Simulations Nos. 2 and 3
In part because of the rapid movement of the agents, the successful
target strategy diffuses quickly throughout the organization. Suppose we
eliminate movement. How would this change the result? Play
Simulation No. 213 and look at Charts 2A 4 and 2B. 5 By the eighth
round, the movie has locked; no changes are visible, though changes may
occur within deciles. As the charts confirm, there is very little change af-
ter that. Why?
Recall that the grid is only 50% full, and the agents are just tossed
onto the grid at random. Strategies can spread only by agents observing
the strategy and adopting it. Agents lose the ability to observe other
agents when there is no movement. They only observe the agents imme-
diately around them, and that will frequently result, as it does in Simula-
tion No. 2, in a checkerboard, where local groups of agents play the same
strategies, but many deciles survive. By the final round in Simulation
No. 2, 58% of the agents are in the target decile, but 24% are in the adja-
cent blue decile, and roughly 13.5% are in the adjacent green decile.
That accounts for 95% of the agents, but 5% are still in other deciles.
Movement clearly makes a big difference. To see this, set the
movement rate at 5% (meaning that in each round, each agent has a 1 in
20 chance of changing locations), play Simulation No. 316 and look at
Charts 3A 17 and 3B." By the tenth round, only three deciles have an ap-
preciable number of agents: blue at 20.6%; target red at 73.5%; and
green at 5.2%. By the twentieth round, blue is at 10.5%, red at 88.5%,
and green is gone. By the fiftieth round, blue is at 0.4% and red at
99.6%. Movement-which is one way in which agents communicate-
clearly matters for the success of organized decision making. Movement
13. Randal C. Picker, SimLaw 2011, at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Picker/IllinoisPaper/
MM2AMOOV.AVI (last visited Nov. 5,2001).
14. Randal C. Picker, SimLaw 2011, at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Picker/IllinoisPaper/
Chart2A.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
15. Randal C. Picker, SimLaw 2011, at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Picker/IllinoisPaper/
Chart2B.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
16. Randal C. Picker, SimLaw 2011, at http://www.law.uchicago.eduIPicker/IllinoisPaper/
MM3AMOOV.AVI (last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
17. Randal C. Picker, SimLaw 2011, at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Picker/IllinoisPaper/
Chart3A.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
18. Randal C. Picker, SimLaw 2011, at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Picker/lltinoisPaper/
Chart3B.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
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enhances exposure to other strategies, and a little bit of movement goes a
long way.
C. Simulation No. 4
Movement is not the only thing that matters. Suppose that the tar-
get value used by the coordination function changes after a certain num-
ber of rounds. How well will our agents adapt to that change? This is
important, as we would like a system that is robust to exogenous changes
in the underlying values. Suppose, for example, that the target value
changes from 85 (and red) to 125 (and sky) after fifty rounds of calcula-
tions. Start by reconsidering Simulation No. 1 and Charts 1A and lB.9
This model converged to the target value after approximately fifteen
rounds. This society will be poorly equipped to deal with an exogenous
shift to a new target of 125 in the thirty-fifth round. The society will have
eliminated all of the off-the-beaten-path strategies and be unable to shift
to the new target. Monolithic societies are fragile and lack the robust-
ness to adapt to new conditions and frequently fail.
As should be clear, without mutation, strategies slowly leave the
system and are lost forever. This is a system without memory. The
agents have available to them in each round only the strategies that they
currently observe. Strategies no longer played by any player are lost to
the collective memory. How do we solve this? In the framework of the
model, introduce spontaneous mutation. Play Simulation No. 420 and
look at Charts 4A 21 and 4B.2" In this simulation, 5% of the agents "die"
in each round and are replaced with new agents. The new agents redraw
from the original distribution of strategies, so the full range of choices,
captured as [0-200], are always available, with some probability to the
society.
By the fifth round, only two deciles are present in any meaningful
way, blue at 12.7% and red at 84.8%. By the tenth round, red is at
99.2%, and by the fiftieth round, red is at 99.7%. Given the 5% muta-
tion rate, the system never converges to 100%. In each round, 5% of the
agents switch strategies, but those strategies routinely fail to take root
given that no neighbors are playing the same strategy and that the muta-
tion is far from the target.
In the fiftieth round, the underlying conditions switch and the target
moves from 85 to 125. Ten rounds later, red is at 91%, green, the next
step up, at 4.7%, and sky, the new target, at 3.6%. Then by the seventi-
19. See supra note 12-14.
20. Randal C. Picker, SimLaw 2011, at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Picker/IllinoisPaper/
MM4AMOOV.AVI (last visited Nov. 5,2001).
21. Randal C. Picker, SimLaw 2011, at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Picker/IllinoisPaper/
Chart4A.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
22. Randal C. Picker, SimLaw 2011, at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Picker/IllinoisPaper/
Chart4B.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
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eth round, the change is stunning: red is at 2.6%, on its way to vanishing;
green is at 18.6%; and sky at 78.3%. Ten rounds later, sky's victory is
complete at 99.3%. Mutation reintroduces the strategies to the system,
and that makes it possible for this society to turn on a dime and adapt to
the new target quickly.
III. LAW AND ORGANIZED DECISION MAKING BY INDIVIDUALS
The lessons of the agent-based simulation framework are relatively
crisp:
* Simple individual decision rules are completely consistent
with sophisticated decisions in the aggregate.
* Isolation or incomplete networks breed bad decisions.
* Dense networks lead to good diffusion of information and
good decisions.
" Even minimal movement substantially improves communi-
cations and ultimate decisions.
That said, I do not want to be understood to say that organizing de-
cision making will mute all of the genuine problems of isolated-individual
bounded rationality. Organizations may organize poorly, and thus, we
may be able to sustain bad decision processes. Thaler's work on
bounded rationality in financial markets suggests that these problems are
still substantial.23 It is not clear whether these problems are intrinsic,
meaning that rationality is simply too bounded to allow us to design
around, or simply reflect early and inadequate efforts to address the is-
sues of bounded rationality. Additionally, individuals left to their own
devices may not organize decisions well. Herd behavior,24 information
cascades, and fads' are examples of referential decision making, and this
may or may not enhance social welfare. Groups can also polarize in
tightly wedded situations, such as juries and cults.26
What does all of this mean for individuals? Outside of organiza-
tions, individuals can organize decisions by looking to information
sources for help. These information sources may be from organizations
devoted to creating this information, such as Consumer Reports, J.D.
Power and Associates, and the like. Individuals also may look to their
local reference groups-neighbors, coworkers, fellow congregants-for
information as well.
Individuals will structure reference groups on their own. This is
most obviously true for teenagers who may look to others in assessing
23. See RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 239-350 (1991).
24. See Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797, 797-801
(1992).
25. See Sushil Bikchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informa-
tional Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992, 992-95, 1014-17 (1992).
26. See Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000).
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what behavior is or is not appropriate. The very idea of "Keeping up
with the Joneses" captures the idea of consumption decisions driven by
reference groups." Inner city youths may join gangs because they have
been deprived of any other reference point for decision making. As
these examples suggest, we should care quite a bit about how these ref-
erence groups are organized.
Changing these patterns might require dramatic governmental steps
that would be flatly inconsistent with our notions of freedom of associa-
tion. In the framework of my model, it is as if we would plop an individ-
ual down in the middle of a new cluster of individuals, so that she can ob-
serve their choices and outcomes. Obviously, to some extent, we do
regulate freedom of association; antidiscrimination laws are one way in
which we do this. The agent-based models in this essay suggest that the
increased heterogeneity of exposure that results may improve matters for
everybody. To some extent, the government can also influence associa-
tional outcomes, as it does by subsidizing public schools and limiting
school vouchers. Again, this may increase exposure to different indi-
viduals-but only partially if we really live in a Tiebout world, where
public schools sort into likes with likes-and again the examples suggest
that will lead to better overall decision making.
In a much narrower sense, we could switch from considering legal
policies that regulate or influence associations and turn instead to expo-
sure and a revised form of information disclosure. We could embed in-
dividuals into virtual reference groups. Through these, we would not
have information disclosures driven by simplification- the Plain English
movement-but rather disclosures of the decisions that others made un-
der similar circumstances and the results of those decisions. In a phrase,
these would be experience disclosures.
As any web surfer will tell you, this is happening every day on the
web. Smart websites are creating customer experience databases and
making these available to their customers. Amazon.com asks readers to
read books and submit reviews and ratings via e-mail. You can read the
reviews, and the ratings are aggregated into a single rating. These web-
sites not only provide access to the product and a way to order it, but
compile information from their customers. Online user groups played
this role before the advent of the web, and the Better Business Bureau
has collected complaints from customers for years.
What does this mean at a practical level? Suppose that we printed
pictures of smokers on the back of packs of cigarettes, along with a tag
line. These pictures would be chosen at random from a database that
would be compiled from a voluntary, random survey of smokers, and
would change from pack to pack. Some of the smokers, presumably,
27. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER (1999) (analyzing research demonstrating
that purchasing is driven by the need to match a chosen reference group); JULIET B. SCHOR, THE
OVERSPENT AMERICAN (1998) (same).
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would be quite happy with their choice and would express that in the tag
line. Others would undoubtedly regret the choice, and would express
that. Smokers would be exposed to the experiences of other smokers on
a daily basis.'
To consider another decision of some significance, suppose that we
required a woman seeking an abortion to watch six randomly selected
five-minute videotapes of women describing their abortion experiences.
Or consider information relating to fertility. The decisions of the Ameri-
can Infertility Association and the American Society of Reproductive
Medicine to conduct a traditional information campaign about fertility
problems has been controversial, 9 but the impetus for the campaign is
clear: many couples have fertility problems, miscarriages are unfortu-
nately common, and age matters.
Think of this as reference-group perturbation. The problem of
knowing when you have identified an optimal amount of information to
make a decision is quite hard. It is possible that as a society we could de-
cide there are certain significant decisions where the focus is on whether
the person has received a broad base of information. The strategy of ref-
erence-group perturbation should have consequences only for those who
have weak priors, so that the new information moves them substantially.
We are appropriately concerned if small amounts of information result in
large discontinuities in decision making.
Why should there be a role for government in experience disclo-
sure? Disclosure by the provider, of course, will be one sided: when you
ask a potential building contractor for references, you know that you are
not going to hear about the failed projects, only the ones that went
smoothly. Cigarette billboards focus on young, vibrant smokers having
fun, not a fifty-eight-year-old lung-cancer victim. We could rely on com-
peting disclosure/advertising, but then we may get the battle of the ex-
tremes rather than an honestly random draw from the available informa-
tion. We may have neutrals, who have no stake in the outcome, provide
this information-think of Roger Ebert and computer reviews in PC
magazines-but there needs to be a market for this, which may not exist.
Would a fifteen-year-old kid who wants to start smoking because it
would be cool, or make his parents mad, pay for information about
smoking? More generally, does a person with a weak prior know that
she has a weak prior, and that buying more information would make
sense? The answers are unclear.
28. This is reminiscent of the campaign to put the pictures of missing kids on milk cartons, a
campaign ultimately abandoned as it was thought that it made the risk of becoming a missing child too
salient. See Bill Lagattuta, 48 Hours: Lost Lives; Pictures of Missing Children on Milk Cartons Discon-
tinued Because It Struck Fear in Parents and Children (CBS television broadcast, Feb. 15, 1996).
29. See Claudia Kalb et al., Should You Have Your Baby Now?; A Group of Doctors Thinks
Advances in Fertility Treatment Have Given Women Too Much Hope, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 19505131.
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We might want to guard against this. How and in what contexts?
Two strategies come to mind: filters/tests/licenses and duties to provide
and disclose reference points. The first approach tests for decision-
making ability directly. So, for example, we allow anyone to buy over-
the-counter medication, but create a separate class of prescription medi-
cation and only permit licensed professionals-doctors-to allow use.
This kind of licensing or capability testing is relatively expensive and is
typically reserved for situations where there is a lot at stake. Information
disclosure, including the kinds of reference disclosures suggested here, is
usually less costly, though more uncertain.
IV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this essay is just to give a flavor of how agent-based
computer simulation might be used to help us understand law. In its
most basic form, we will use agent simulation to look at small artificial
societies to learn where they succeed and how they fail. In the examples
here, we see that simple-minded agents can make smart decisions in the
aggregate and, as a group, can learn and communicate quite successfully.
The examples should suggest that, even if economic decision makers are
not the perfect rational superminds typically found in most economic
models, more limited individuals can still thrive in the right context. We
can also test in this framework how sensitive outcomes are to small varia-
tions. In the examples, even small amounts of movement-a proxy for
communication-can be important, as can a minimal amount of muta-
tion.
With these examples in hand, it is possible to make some sugges-
tions about law. The models suggest the importance of exposure to dif-
ference. We can certainly understand many antidiscrimination laws as
having that consequence. We also know that broad social policies, such
as those relating to public schools and vouchers, will impact daily expo-
sure as well. Less intrusively, information disclosure can alter an indi-
vidual's reference groups, and, again, the agent simulation examples
show powerfully how outcomes can be altered.
As agent simulation spreads over the next decade, we can expect to
see models attempt to incorporate more directly institutional and legal
features. This will be hard-and there have been few successes to date-
but the ability to test policies beforehand would be a huge accomplish-
ment, and might be fun to boot. SimLaw anyone?
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